Ecuador homicides fall in 2026 but violence clusters on the coast

Ecuador's long-running crackdown on transnational criminal organizations has coincided with a fall in national homicide numbers this year, but the improvement is uneven and violence appears to be moving between cities rather than receding. For travellers, the location of that violence matters: the coastal provinces that hold the country's main ports and export corridors account for the overwhelming majority of killings, while tourist attractions in Quito's historic centre are described as threatened by cartels.

Key facts

• 4,882 homicides were recorded between January and July 2026, against 5,295 in the same period of 2025.
• Murders still increased in 79 cities, and the June and July 2026 totals were higher than in those months a year earlier.
• The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that roughly 90 percent of Ecuador's homicides occur in coastal provinces home to about half the population.
• Ecuador has been under an "internal armed conflict" designation since January 2024, with the military deployed and repeated states of emergency imposed.
• Growth is slowing but continuing: real gross domestic product (GDP) expanded 3.7 percent in 2025 after a 2024 contraction, and the IMF projects about 2.5 percent growth in 2026.

What is the security situation?

Under President Daniel Noboa, Ecuador has reclassified organized crime from a law-enforcement problem to a national-security threat. The government has expanded intelligence operations and security cooperation with the United States, and since May 2024 authorities have captured at least 17 high-value criminal targets. Jose Adolfo Macias, known as "Fito," the leader of Los Choneros, escaped from prison in January 2024, was recaptured in June 2025 and was subsequently extradited to the U.S. after escaping again.

Removing leaders has not resolved the problem. The number of identifiable gangs rose by 54 percent between 2023 and 2024, according to data cited by Human Rights Watch, as organizations splintered into competing factions. Prisons also remain dangerous: 1,220 inmate deaths were recorded in 2025, including at least 206 from violent clashes, with the prison population running about 30 percent above planned capacity.

Where is the violence concentrated?

Most killings occur along the coast, according to the IMF estimate, in provinces that include Ecuador's key ports, commercial centres and export corridors. Criminal groups use containerized exports, fishing fleets and commercial ports to conceal narcotics in legitimate trade. In August 2026 the U.S. Treasury sanctioned an Ecuador-based network linked to Los Choneros and Los Lobos that allegedly used fishing businesses around the city of Manta to move cocaine; Washington had designated the two groups as foreign terrorist organizations in September 2025.

What does this mean for travellers?

The report states that violence discourages tourism and investment and that insecurity around ports threatens industries relying on reliable logistics. It identifies tourist attractions in Quito's historic centre as threatened by transnational drug cartels. Travellers comparing itineraries should note that the bulk of recorded homicides is concentrated in the coastal provinces rather than spread evenly across the country.

What could happen next?

The analysis sets out three scenarios. The most likely sees Ecuador gradually restricting criminal organizations without dismantling them, with homicide rates remaining exceptionally high by historical standards. A somewhat likely outcome is tactical success without lasting gains, as new factions emerge and violence shifts between municipalities. The least likely scenario is that criminal groups achieve parallel authority and damage Ecuador's reputation as an investment destination and logistics hub.

On the economic side, the report notes that greater security around ports and major cities could improve investor confidence and support recovery in the country's dollarized economy and export sectors. The analysis concludes that the decisive measure of progress will be whether Ecuador rebuilds institutions faster than organized crime adapts to them.